Monetary Transmission Mechanism in India: A Quarterly Model by Kapur, Muneesh & Behera, Harendra
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Monetary Transmission Mechanism in
India: A Quarterly Model
Muneesh Kapur and Harendra Behera
Reserve Bank of India
25 June 2012
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/70631/
MPRA Paper No. 70631, posted 14 April 2016 06:46 UTC
 
 
 
 
 
W P S (DEPR) :  09/ 2012 
RBI WORKING PAPER SERIES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Monetary Transmission Mechanism 
in India: A Quarterly Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Muneesh Kapur 
and  
Harendra Behera 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC AND POLICY RESEARCH 
 
JUNE 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) introduced the RBI Working Papers series in 
March 2011. These papers present research in progress of the staff members 
of RBI and are disseminated to elicit comments and further debate. The 
views expressed  in  these  papers  are  those  of  authors  and  not  that  
of  RBI. Comments and observations may please be forwarded to authors. 
Citation and use of such papers should take into account its provisional 
character. 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright: Reserve Bank of India 2012 
1 
 
Monetary Transmission Mechanism in India: A Quarterly Model 
 
Muneesh Kapur and Harendra Behera1 
 
This paper examines monetary transmission mechanism for India in the 
context of a small macro model using quarterly data. Given the volatility emanating 
from the agricultural sector, the paper models both overall growth and overall 
inflation as well as non-agricultural growth and non-food manufactured products 
inflation, i.e., components stripped of the influence from the agricultural sector and 
which are more amenable to monetary actions. Model simulations for a one-
quarter 100 bps increase in the nominal effective policy rate show that the peak 
effect on non-agricultural growth is almost 40 bps with a lag of 2 quarters and that 
on non-food manufactured products inflation is 25 bps with a lag of 5 quarters. 
Therefore, the interest rate channel is effective in the Indian context and the 
magnitude of the impact on growth and inflation is comparable to that in major 
advanced and emerging economies; however, the evidence for both India and 
other countries suggest that the impact of monetary policy actions on inflation is 
modest and subject to lags. The results are sensitive to alternative measures of 
real interest rate. Despite the monetary tightening by Reserve Bank of India during 
2010 and 2011, inflation remained high and this could be attributed to the 
structural component of food inflation as well as the surge in international 
commodity prices beginning the second half of 2010 and continuing into the first 
half of 2011.  
JEL Classification Numbers: E31; E32; E52; E58; F41 
Keywords: Exchange Rate Pass-through, India, Monetary Policy, Monetary Policy 
Reaction Function, Monetary Transmission, Neutral Interest Rate, Phillips Curve. 
 
Inflation in India was persistently high during 2010 and 2011. In response, 
monetary policy was progressively tightened beginning March 2010 – the effective 
policy rate was increased by 525 basis points (bps) from 3.25 per cent in March 
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2010 to 8.50 per cent in October 2011. Over this period, domestic growth slowed 
down, while inflation remained relatively sticky. The slowdown in growth was not 
only due to the monetary stance, but also the global economic recovery losing 
momentum over euro area sovereign debt concerns and domestic policy and 
regulatory concerns (RBI, 2011b).  
According to the standard monetary transmission mechanism, variations in 
interest rates first impact aggregate demand and GDP growth, which, in turn, then 
impact inflation. Therefore, inflation management needs some temporary loss of 
output. To the extent that growth may be impacted, it must be understood as a 
short-term trade-off, with positive consequences for long-term performance 
(Gokarn, 2011). The Reserve Bank’s anti-inflationary stance has been criticised 
from two different directions – for being hawkish from one side and for being soft 
on inflation from the other side. The proponents of the first view argue that inflation 
is driven largely by supply shocks and monetary policy response to such inflation 
would only end up hurting growth. The criticism from the other side has been that 
the Reserve Bank was soft on inflation and this led to the persistence of inflation. 
Both these critiques cannot obviously be right at the same time (Subbarao, 2011). 
In this context, as the Economic Survey 2011-12 (Government of India 
(GoI), 2012) observes, the question is: How sharp are the connections between 
monetary policy instruments and inflation? While the simple “correlation between 
the policy instruments and inflation is slender”, a “careful statistical analysis by 
putting in lags” indicates “that the policy instruments do have an impact on inflation 
with a lag.... Nevertheless, there is plenty of white noise and the correlations are 
far from perfect. So much so that there is room for a multiplicity of opinions about 
what constitutes optimal control... The RBI increasingly voiced concern that the 
fiscal deficit that the government was tolerating was too high and made its task of 
controlling inflation harder. There were some in government who felt that the 
monetary tightening, successively 13 times, was not having adequate impact on 
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inflation and the hardening interest rates were instead impacting more on growth 
(pp. 25-26, GoI, 2012). 
Against this backdrop, this paper assesses monetary transmission 
dynamics – the impact of monetary policy actions on demand, output and inflation 
- in India using a small model. The paper quantifies the impact of interest rates 
and other determinants on growth and inflation. It also models the response of the 
central bank to growth and inflation dynamics.  
Section I briefly discusses the various transmission channels of monetary 
policy and assesses the cross-country empirical evidence. Section II sets out the 
model framework, while Section III presents the empirical findings. Section IV 
concludes.   
I. Monetary Transmission Channels 
There are four key channels of monetary transmission: (a) interest rate 
channel; (b) quantum channel relating to credit; (c) asset price channel; and (d) 
exchange rate channel (Boivin, Kiley and Mishkin, 2011; Bernanke and Gertler, 
1995). The first channel - the interest rate channel - is the key channel of monetary 
transmission in market-based economies and refers to changes in domestic 
demand and inflation brought about by changes in the policy interest rate. 
Variation in the short-term nominal policy interest rate impacts the spectrum of 
long-terms interest rates and yields. Lower nominal rates, given sticky wages and 
prices, lead to lower real rates. The resultant reduction in cost of credit 
encourages investment and consumption demand, which eventually gets reflected 
in an increase in output and prices.  
The quantum channel - the credit channel - complements and amplifies the 
interest rate channel. The credit channel operates through the availability of bank 
credit (the traditional bank-lending channel or the narrow credit channel) and 
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through the impact of interest rates on asset prices, and cash flows and net worth 
of borrower’s (the broader credit channel, or the balance-sheet channel or the net 
worth channel). For bank-dominated economies, the narrow credit channel is 
important and for financial market-dominated economies, the broader credit 
channel is important.  
The asset price channel – the impact of changes in interest rates on 
movements in asset prices like real estate and equity prices - generate wealth 
effects in terms of market valuations of financial assets and liabilities, which then 
impacts consumption and investment. Finally, the exchange rate channel - higher 
domestic interest rates induce an appreciation of the domestic currency – has a 
direct impact on domestic prices (appreciation of the domestic currency makes 
imported goods cheaper) and aggregate demand (appreciation reduces net 
exports and hence demand).  
The various channels are not mutually exclusive and there is considerable 
feedback and interaction among them. The relative importance of each channel 
may differ from one economy to another as well as over time for any given 
economy depending on a number of factors such as the degree of monetisation of 
the economy, the extent to which households borrow from the formal financial 
system, the state of development of financial markets, the instruments available to 
monetary policy, the fiscal stance and the degree of openness.  
Empirical Evidence: Cross-Country 
Cross-country studies of monetary transmission show lagged impact of 
monetary impulses on growth and inflation. For instance, in a vector 
autoregression (VAR) framework, for the US economy, output, consumption, 
investment and inflation display a hump-shaped response; the peak effect on 
output is found to occur about 1.5 years after a monetary policy shock and on 
inflation after about 2 years (Christiano et al., 1999). Boivin et al. (2011) compare 
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the impact of monetary policy shocks for the period 1962Q1–1979Q3 with the 
period 1984Q1–2008Q4 in a factor-augmented VAR (FAVAR) model as well as a 
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model for the US. According to the 
FAVAR model, the magnitude of responses of real GDP was greater in the pre-
1979Q3 period than in the post-1984Q1 period, but the response in the later 
period was more delayed and persistent; the response of prices was considerably 
reduced in the post-1984Q1 period, compared to the earlier period, which these 
authors attribute to better anchoring of inflationary expectations. The results are 
qualitatively similar in their DSGE model, but there are important differences from 
the FAVAR responses - inflation and output jump following a policy innovation in 
the DSGE model, whereas the identifying assumption underlying the FAVAR 
responses excluded this possibility. According to the DSGE model results, during 
the 1984Q1-2008Q4 period, an increase of 100 bps in the policy rate reduces real 
GDP by around 40 bps with a lag of 2 quarters and inflation by around 30 bps with 
a lag of 3 quarters2. 
Els et al. (2003) examine monetary transmission in the euro area across a 
range of models – a VAR model and three macro models. For an increase of 100 
bps in the interest rate (maintained for two years), they find that the maximum 
effect on output is reached in the first 1-2 years and GDP contracts by 20-40 bps 
after 1 year and by 30-70 bps after 2 years across models. The effect on prices is 
felt more slowly and is more persistent. Prices decline by 20-40 bps after 3 years.  
For the United Kingdom, according to the Bank of England’s (BoE’s) macro 
model, in response to an increase of 100 bps in interest rates (increased for 4 
quarters), the peak decline in output is 0.3 per cent (after about a year) and output 
returns to the baseline after 3 years. Inflation is broadly unchanged during the first 
year and the peak decline of 0.3 per cent occurs by the beginning of the third year 
(Bank of England, 2000). These results broadly carry through the BoE’s DSGE 
                                            
2 These numbers are computed from Figure 7 (page 407) of Boivin et al. (2011). 
6 
 
model (the Bank of England Quarterly Model, BEQM). The notable differences vis-
à-vis the earlier macro model are: first, the demand effects come through a little 
more quickly in the BEQM, reflecting the stronger short-run response of 
consumption to interest rate changes in the BEQM; second, the effects of the 
temporary change in interest rates on inflation are somewhat less persistent in the 
BEQM, reflecting forward-looking households and firms who expect monetary 
policy will be set so as to return inflation to the base (Bank of England, 2004). 
Similar growth-inflation dynamics and lags are corroborated by more recent 
studies for other countries. For Sweden, a one-quarter 100 bps increase in the 
policy rate reduces output by 50 bps (peak effect) and inflation by 20 bps (peak 
effect) after 6 quarters according to MOSES3, the aggregated econometric model 
for Sweden (Bardsen et al., 2011). For Norway, the peak decline in output is 40-70 
bps (lag of 5-6 quarters) across a range of VAR models while that in inflation is 20-
30 bps (lag of 9-11 quarters) following a one-period tightening of 100 bps; 
according to the Norges Bank’s macro-model (NEMO), the peak decline in output 
and inflation for a similar monetary policy shock is 40 bps (after 4 quarters) and 25 
bps (after 2 years) (Olsen, 2011). In response to a similar monetary policy shock, 
for Japan, the peak decline in output and inflation is 14 bps (after 7 quarters) and 4 
bps (after 10 quarters) according to the Bank of Japan’s large-scale hybrid-type 
macro model (Fukunaga et al., 2011). The relatively smaller impact of monetary 
policy on output and prices in Japan could perhaps be a reflection of the reduced 
efficacy of monetary policy in view of near zero policy interest rates since the mid-
1990s.   
The transmission lags in emerging market economies broadly follow a 
similar pattern as in key advanced economies, albeit the lags are shorter in some 
cases. The interest rate channel gained importance in the EMEs during the 2000s 
(Mohanty and Turner, 2008). During the 2000s, monetary policy frameworks in the 
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EMEs became more credible, and central banks were more flexible in their 
operations, benefitting from reduced fiscal dominance and greater exchange rate 
flexibility. These shifts and the associated balance sheet changes strengthened 
the interest rate channel and inflation in most EMEs became lower and less 
volatile. Mukherjee and Bhattacharya (2011) assess monetary transmission 
mechanism in select inflation targeting EMEs in a panel regression framework and 
find that private consumption and private investment decline by 26 bps and 46 bps 
in response to an increase of 100 bps in real deposit rate and real lending rate, 
respectively.  
Turning to select country experiences, for Poland, a hike in short-term 
interest rates of 100 bps sustained for 4 quarters results in a reduction in GDP 
growth of 30 bps after 4 quarters and a reduction in inflation of 20 bps after 8 
quarters (Pruski and Szpunar, 2008). In Brazil, a one-period 100 bps increase in 
interest rate leads to a peak decline of 12 bps in output after 2 quarters 
(cumulative decline of 23 bps in output in the first year), while inflation decline 
peaks at just under 40 bps in the third quarter. The bulk of the effects on both 
output and inflation take place within 4 quarters. The transmission lags are thus 
shorter than in advanced economies, attributable to factors such as shorter 
maturity of domestic credit, and the considerable weight of the exchange rate in 
domestic currency pricing (Catão et al., 2008). For Chile, the results from a 
structural model indicate that a one-quarter 100 bps increase in the interest rate 
reduces output by 60 bps (the peak effect) after 1 quarter; the peak reduction in 
inflation is 25 bps after 7 quarters (Garcia et al., 2005). 
In Mexico, exchange rate fluctuations have become less important in the 
determination of prices, while interest rate movements have had a faster and 
stronger effect on inflation on the back of the expectations channel of monetary 
policy (Sidaoui and Ramos-Francia, 2008). For some EMEs, the exchange rate 
channel remains a dominant force. For example, for Indonesia, in the post-Asian 
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crisis period, exchange rate movements have become more pronounced in 
affecting output and prices, while the effectiveness of monetary policy to influence 
the exchange rate has been undermined with exchange rate movements being 
driven more by non-economic factors. Although the interest rate channel still works 
quite well in transmitting monetary policy, its magnitude has been affected by 
conditions in the banking system and overall higher uncertainty and risk factors 
(Goeltom, 2008). For Hungary, prices are affected in the first year after an 
increase in the policy rate and the response is persistent. However, output reacts 
only marginally as the drop in investment after monetary tightening is offset by 
pick-up in consumption; the output response is mitigated by short-run nominal 
wage rigidity and the quick exchange rate pass-through, as a result of which the 
income effect offsets the interest rate effect on consumption (Vonnák, 2008). 
To summarise, the cross-country empirical evidence indicates that the peak 
effect of monetary policy on output and inflation in advanced economies occurs 
after a lag of around 4 and 6 quarters, respectively. The lags appear to be 
relatively shorter in EMEs. The peak effect of an increase of 100 bps in interest 
rate is around 30-70 bps on output and around 20-40 bps on inflation. However, 
the transmission lags as well as the impact of monetary policy on growth and 
inflation can change over period as well as across models as documented, for 
example, by Olsen (2011) for Norway (Chart 1).  
Empirical Evidence: India  
Monetary transmission dynamics for the Indian economy have been studied 
in a number of studies using alternative approaches. VAR approaches have been 
used to assess various aspects of transmission, inter alia, in Ray, Joshi and 
Saggar (1998), Al-Mashat (2003), RBI (2004), Aleem (2010), Bhattacharya et al. 
(2011), and Khundrakpam and Das (2011). New Keynesian model (NKM) to 
assess transmission has been estimated in RBI (2002), and Patra and Kapur 
(2012) and calibrated in Goyal (2008) and Anand et al. (2010). Individual 
9 
 
equations of the NKM have also been estimated in a number of papers, with most 
of them concentrated on the Philips curve [for example, Kapur and Patra (2000), 
Dua and Gaur (2009), Paul (2009), Patra and Ray (2010), Mazumdar (2011), 
Singh et al. (2011)]. Taylor-type rules have been examined in Mohanty and Klau 
(2004), Virmani (2004), Srinivasan et al. (2008), Takeshi and Hamori (2009), 
Anand et al. (2010), Hutchison et al (2010), and Singh (2010)4.  
RBI (2004) analysed monetary transmission through a VAR using the index 
of industrial production, wholesale price index, Bank Rate, broad money and 
exchange rate. The peak effect of an interest rate shock on output and inflation 
occurred after 6 months, consistent with evidence of shorter lags in EMEs. The 
lags are corroborated by Aleem (2010) who find that the peak decline in both GDP 
and prices occurs in the third quarter after the interest rate shock. Mohanty (2012), 
using a quarterly structural VAR (SVAR) model, finds that policy rate increases 
have a negative effect on output and inflation; the peak effect on output growth 
takes with a lag of two quarters and that on inflation with a lag of three quarters. 
The overall impact persists through 8-10 quarters. These results are found to be 
robust across alternative specifications with different measures of output, inflation 
and liquidity. Anand et al. (2010) employ a DSGE model framework and their 
results indicate that the peak effect of a 100 bps increase in the nominal policy 
rate (call rate) is 35-45 bps on output and around 15 bps on inflation and the peak 
effect on both output and inflation is felt in the first quarter after the policy rate 
shock.  
In contrast, according to Bhattacharya et al. (2011), the interest rate 
channel in India is weak and the most effective mechanism is the exchange rate 
channel. According to their long-run cointegrating relationship, an increase of 100 
bps in the call money rate has a negligible impact on industrial production (their 
activity variable) and a reduction of only 1 bps in inflation; in comparison, one per 
                                            
4 See Patra and Kapur (2012) for a detailed review and critique of studies on monetary policy 
reaction function, and Kapur (2012) on Philips curve studies in the Indian context. 
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cent currency depreciation increases inflation by 20 bps. The impact of interest 
rate on inflation is not direct, but through the exchange rate channel: higher 
interest rates lead to appreciation of domestic currency, which then impacts 
inflation. Similarly, Bhalla (2011) is sceptic about monetary policy’s ability to 
contain inflation; according to him, “there is no evidence - zero -  to link the decline 
in India’s inflation rate post 1996 to Indian monetary policy, while there is a lot to 
link the decline in India’s GDP growth rate to this very same policy”. Goyal (2008) 
finds that a monetary stimulus preceding a temporary supply shock can abort 
inflation at minimum output cost, on account of exchange rate appreciation, 
accompanying a fall in interest rates and rise in output.  
Given the bank-dominated financial system, the credit channel has also 
been focus of studies. RBI (2010) reports evidence in favour of credit channel in 
the context of VAR model. Increase in call money rate leads to lower growth in 
non-food credit in the fifth quarter and GDP growth in the seventh quarter. The 
estimated impact is found to be modest and tapers off gradually. The causality 
running from GDP growth to credit growth turns out to be statistically significant, 
suggesting credit following, rather than leading the pick-up in growth momentum. 
Khundrakpam (2011) finds the credit channel to be significant and robust. An 
increase of 100 bps in the policy rate was found to reduce bank credit by 2.2-2.8 
per cent. Pandit and Vashisht (2011) examine the credit channel for India and six 
other EMEs in a panel regression framework and find that the policy rate is an 
important determinant of firms’ demand for bank credit, which confirms the role of 
countercyclical monetary policy tool for setting the pace of economic activity. 
Banerjee (2011) examines the direction of credit-output causality for the period 
1950-2011 and finds changes in the causality direction over the period: output was 
predominantly driven by credit in the pre-1980s period, nearly no relationship 
between the two during the 1980s and credit being primarily driven by output in the 
post-reforms period. For the non-agricultural sector as a whole, the unidirectional 
causality from output to credit in the post-reforms period stressed the importance 
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of output in determining the quantum of flow of credit. However, at the industry 
level, a few industries exhibited bidirectional causality. 
Khundrakpam and Das (2011) examine the relative response of food and 
manufactured products prices to change in interest rate and money supply. They 
find that, in the long-run, variations in money supply impact prices of both food and 
manufactured products prices but the impact of money supply is more on food 
prices than on manufactured products prices; in contrast, variations in call rate 
have a negative effect only on manufactured products prices. Their findings 
suggest that the quantum channel is more potent vis-a-vis the interest rate to deal 
with supply shocks.  
II. The Model 
The key approaches to study monetary transmission are estimation of VAR 
models or macro models. While the VAR-based approach is quite popular in 
empirical research, its key limitation is the atheoretic nature and the number of 
variables it can handle in the context of short-sample periods. This limitation is 
especially relevant in the Indian context since quarterly GDP data are available 
from 1996 onwards. Moreover, VAR studies have typically focussed on the 
transmission lags, while being silent on the impact of monetary policy on growth 
and inflation, which are critical input for monetary policy calibration. A number of 
studies in the Indian context have used monthly IIP data as an indicator of 
economic activity. Inflation reflects overall demand-supply mismatches in the 
economy. Industrial sector accounts for less than a fifth of total GDP in India and 
hence it could be a misleading indicator of demand pressures in the economy. 
Finally, the VAR approach implicitly assumes a backward-looking monetary policy 
reaction function. In the actual world, given the monetary lags, monetary policy 
has to be forward-looking and needs to responds to expected inflation and growth 
and not their past values. For India, the evidence in Patra and Kapur (2012) shows 
that a forward-looking monetary policy reaction function yields coefficients 
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consistent with the Taylor principle (and hence are stabilising), while the 
backward-looking reaction function results in the inflation coefficient below unity. 
Thus, a VAR-based approach could end up with misleading conclusions. 
Residuals from the VAR regressions used to represent exogenous policy shocks 
often bear little resemblance to standard interpretations of the historical record of 
policy actions and the VAR residuals differ across specifications (Walsh, 2010).  
Notwithstanding these limitations, the VAR framework remains an important 
approach to assess monetary transmission and provides a useful method to 
corroborate findings from alternative methodologies. In the Indian context, given 
the still limited studies on monetary transmission, it would be useful to explore 
alternative approaches to study the transmission mechanism, including the VAR 
framework. It would also be interesting to assess the forecasting performance of 
alternative approaches. For example, Hammersland and Traee (2012) compare 
forecasting performance for a structural model with AR and VAR models for 
Norway and find: first, the accuracy of the structural model is better than AR and 
VAR for forecasting wage inflation and GDP growth on all horizons; second, the 
VAR model is the best on all horizons for forecasting core inflation, the rate of 
unemployment, the lending rate and the real exchange rate; and, finally, the 
relative advantage of the structural model seems to increase with the forecast 
horizon. Thus, alternative modelling approaches may be needed to have robust 
forecast for variables of interest to monetary policy. 
In view of the above debate and in order to explore and develop alternative 
approaches, this paper prefers to examine monetary transmission dynamics in 
India through the estimation of a small model, drawing from the New Keynesian 
perspectives (Clarida et al. 1999; Woodford, 2003; Gali, 2008) and empirical 
studies on the various building blocks of the NKM (Gali and Gertler, 1999; 
Goodhart and Hoffman, 2005 a, b; Taylor, 1993; Clarida et al. 1998, 2000; Paez-
Farrell, 2009).  
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While the New Keynesian model is purely forward-looking, available 
empirical evidence is mixed. In particular, the New Keynesian Philips Curve 
(NKPC) and its forward-looking character is debatable. While Gali and Gertler 
(1999) and Gali, Gertler, and Lopez-Salido (2005) argue in favour of NKPC, Rudd 
and Whelan (2007) argue that its empirical estimates are subject to serious 
identification issues. The NKPC specification does not distinguish forward-looking 
models from backward-looking models; the higher weight on expected inflation 
found by the proponents of NKPC may be due to misspecification resulting from 
omission of explanatory variables from the main equation. Typically, expected 
inflation is instrumented through lagged inflation amongst the instrument set and 
this can bias the coefficient of expected inflation to be higher and NKPC can yield 
large estimates of the coefficient of expected inflation even when forward-looking 
behaviour is completely absent.  
In view of the above debate, this paper builds upon the evidence presented 
in Patra and Kapur (2012), who estimate a range of specifications - purely forward 
looking, backward-looking and hybrid versions - for the three key equations of the 
NKM, viz. the IS curve, the Philips curve and the monetary policy reaction function; 
their results favoured a forward-looking monetary policy rule, but backward-looking 
Phillips curve and IS curve. In view of these findings, we estimate a forward-
looking monetary policy rule (following Clarida et al. 1998, 2000; Paez-Farrell, 
2009) and backward-looking Phillips curve (following Gordon 1998, 2011) and IS 
curve (following Goodhart and Hoffman, 2005 a, b).  
This paper extends the analysis in Patra and Kapur (2012) in a number of 
directions. First, apart from overall GDP, this paper also focuses on its major 
components (industry, services and non-agricultural GDP). Second, given the 
monetary policy interest in the impact of policy actions on real GDP growth, the IS 
curve analysis in this paper is in terms of growth rates of output than that in terms 
of output gaps. Third, alternative indicators of real interest rates are used in this 
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paper to assess the sensitivity of results. Fourth, given the focus of monetary 
policy on non-food manufactured products inflation as an indicator of demand-side 
pressures, non-food manufactured products inflation dynamics have also been 
modelled in addition to headline inflation. Fifth, and related to the previous point, 
two variants of monetary policy reaction functions are modelled:  one as 
responding to headline inflation and overall GDP and the other responding to non-
food manufactured products inflation and non-agricultural GDP. Sixth, the analysis 
also attempts at assessing the impact of oil prices, bank credit and fiscal policy on 
output. Seventh, the influence of minimum support prices and monsoon rainfall on 
inflation and the feedback from headline inflation to minimum support prices are 
also analysed. Eighth, determinants of non-food bank credit are also assessed. 
Finally, this paper extends the analysis to the quarter ended March 2011. 
We, therefore, estimate the following model. First, following the Phillips 
curve approach, inflation is modelled as a function of domestic demand conditions, 
supply shocks, rainfall conditions, trends in minimum support prices and inflation 
expectations (proxied by lagged inflation). Second, minimum support prices are 
endogenised, given their role in the inflation process. Third, following the IS curve 
framework, output growth is assumed to depend upon interest rate, bank credit, 
asset prices, external demand, oil prices and real exchange rate. As discussed 
later, we estimate growth equations separately for nominal and real interest rates 
to check sensitivity to the choice of the interest rate as also to have some 
comparability with the VAR literature. Fourth, in view of the dominance of the 
banks in the credit system, determinants of demand for bank credit are modelled. 
Finally, the monetary policy reaction function is estimated on the lines of a Taylor 
rule, with the policy rate reacting to deviations of inflation from the inflation 
target/objective and the output gap.  
Although the share of the agricultural sector in GDP has declined over the 
years, it remains significant. At the same time, the agricultural output exhibits 
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substantial volatility given its continued dependence upon monsoon rainfall. 
Similarly, food prices have a large weight in the various price indices and 
agricultural supply shocks impact both food inflation and headline inflation. 
Therefore, volatility in the agricultural sector induces volatility in both overall GDP 
and headline inflation, which poses challenges to modelling. Accordingly, we 
estimate two separate models: one for overall real GDP growth and headline 
inflation and the other model is for non-agricultural GDP growth and non-food 
manufactured products inflation. The equations and the models are specified 
below (variable names are listed in Annex 1;  ,  ,   and   are error terms). 
Schematic presentations of the two models are provided in Charts 2 and 3.  
Model 1: Overall Real GDP Growth and Headline WPI Inflation 
Supply Curve (Phillips Curve) 
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Model 2: Non-agricultural GDP Growth (    ) and Non-food Manufactured 
Products WPI  Inflation (     ) 
  
    
                     
    
     
 
            
                                
 
                               
          
                          
 
                     
                   
    
   
     
                               
 
Real Interest Rate 
While the model specifications above show nominal interest rates in the 
aggregate demand equations, sensitivity of results to the use of nominal as well as 
real interest rates is attempted in the empirical exercise. In theory, real interest 
rates matter for consumption and investment decisions; however, most of the 
media commentary as well as discussions by corporates is typically in terms of 
nominal interest rates rather than real rates. According to Fair (2012), households 
appear to respond more to nominal rates than to real rates. Moreover, the 
appropriate measure of real interest rate remains contentious. In principle, real 
interest rate is nominal interest rate less expected inflation. How does one 
measure expected inflation? The relevant measure of inflation for the purpose of 
computing real interest rate remains a matter of debate (Gokarn, 2011). The 
relevant inflation rate could also differ for different economic agents in the country 
(Mohan, 2002).  
In the absence of a consistent series on inflation expectations, this paper 
attempts alternative measures of real interest rate. Assuming adaptive 
expectations, expected inflation is proxied by following alternative measures: 
current year-on-year (y-o-y) inflation on the one hand and its 4- and 8-quarter 
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moving averages to smoothen out the volatility. Since the relevant inflation rates 
could differ across economic agents, the exercise is done for alternative inflation 
measures: headline WPI inflation, non-food manufactured products WPI inflation 
and GDP deflator inflation. Another alternative measure of real interest rate, 
following Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) and Goodhart and Hofmann (2005a,b), 
is to take four-quarter average of lagged real interest rate (i.e., four-quarter 
average nominal interest rate less four-quarter average of the relevant inflation 
rate). According to Rudebusch and Svensson (1999), the four-quarter average real 
interest rate captures the various intermediate transmission mechanisms involving 
nominal interest rates, ex-ante real short and long rates, exchange rates, and 
possibly direct credit quantities as well. In addition to the four-quarter average of 
the real interest rate, the eight-quarter average is also attempted in this paper. In 
brief, the following alternative real interest rate concepts are used in the empirical 
section: (i)          (ii)            and (iii)          , where ‘int’ is the nominal 
interest rate (effective policy rate or alternatively, call money rate) and ‘ ’ is the 
inflation rate (wholesale price inflation, or non-food manufactured products inflation 
or GDP deflator inflation). Bars over the variables show averages, as defined 
above.  
III. Data and Estimation Results 
Data 
The paper uses quarterly data from the quarter April-June 1996 onwards – 
the period from which quarterly GDP data are available – up to the quarter ended 
March 2011. While year-on-year growth rates of various variables are based on 
actual data series, output gap measures are based on seasonally adjusted data. 
All the data series are stationary5. 
                                            
5
 Unit root tests (Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests, with lag selection based on BIC criteria) indicate 
that the null of unit root can be rejected for all series except ynon, int, nfc, rnfc, πmsp and lb1y. 
According to the KPSS test, these data series - ynon, int, nfc, rnfc, π
msp
 and lb1y -are stationary.  
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As regards the appropriate policy interest rate, the choice is complicated by 
substantial changes in the monetary policy framework and operating procedures 
over the period of the study. The Reserve Bank switched from the monetary 
targeting framework to a multiple indicators framework in 1998. The Bank Rate 
was re-activated in 1997. In the early 2000s, the liquidity adjustment facility (LAF) 
was introduced to manage liquidity through repo (liquidity injection) and reverse 
repo (liquidity absorption) operations. From 2003 till May 2, 2011, monetary policy 
signals were provided through changes in both repo and reverse repo rates in 
conjunction with variations in the cash reserve ratio (Mohan, 2009; Mohan and 
Kapur, 2009). During episodes of excess liquidity (2001 through 2006 and again 
from 2008:4 to 2010:2), the reverse repo rate was the effective policy rate. On the 
other hand, during episodes of monetary tightening/liquidity shortage (2007:1 to 
2008:3 and 2010:3 to 2011:4), the repo rate became the effective policy rate. 
Thus, the policy rate, during the post-2003 period, switched between repo and 
reverse repo rates. Overall, the Bank Rate was the effective policy rate for the first 
few years of the sample and in the subsequent period, repo/reverse repo rate was 
the effective rate. The effective policy rate, thus defined, is used as the policy rate 
as in Patra and Kapur (2012).  
An alternative to the effective policy rate series would be to use call rate 
data, as a number of studies have done; however, the call rates move in response 
to the short-term liquidity conditions and, at times, have overshot the operative 
policy rate, which can impart avoidable noise to the series. Nonetheless, as a 
measure of robustness check, the paper also estimates and reports the impact 
when call rate is used as the policy rate.  
As noted earlier, the operating policy rate alternated between repo and 
reverse repo rates from 2003 till the end of the sample period (2011:1), depending 
upon the prevailing liquidity condition. Thus, there was the lack of a single policy 
rate. Against this background, the operating framework was modified effective May 
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3, 2011. First, the repo rate was made the only one independently varying policy 
rate to transmit policy signals more transparently. Second, a new Marginal 
Standing Facility (MSF) was instituted under which scheduled commercial banks 
(SCBs) can borrow overnight at their discretion up to one per cent of their 
respective NDTL at 100 bps above the repo rate to provide a safety valve against 
unanticipated liquidity shocks. Third, the revised corridor was defined with a fixed 
width of 200 basis points. The repo rate was placed in the middle of the corridor, 
with the reverse repo rate 100 bps below it and the MSF rate 100 bps above it 
(Mohanty, 2011). 
Estimation Results6 
Growth Dynamics 
We model overall real GDP growth as well as its two major components, 
viz, industry and services separately and collectively as non-agricultural growth. 
The services sub-sector ‘community, social and personal services’ is impacted by 
fiscal policy actions directly and given its high volatility, the estimates for services 
and non-agricultural growth exclude this component of services7. As noted earlier, 
we test for the sensitivity of the results to the use of both nominal and real interest 
rates. In the specifications with the nominal interest rate, non-food credit and oil 
inflation are also used in nominal terms; in the specifications with the real interest 
rate, non-food credit and oil inflation are used in real terms.  
                                            
6 All estimations have been done in WinRATS (version 8.10) with standard errors corrected with 
Newey-West/Bartlett window and 3 lags in all cases. In the regressions for growth and inflation, the 
various endogenous variables enter with lags only and hence these equations are estimated with 
OLS. In the monetary policy reaction function, as the explanatory variables are expected values of 
growth and inflation, the estimation is done through Generalised Method of Moments (GMM). 
7 The share of the sub-sector ‘community, social and personal services’ in GDP was 13 per cent in 
2010-11; the share of the services sector (excluding community, social and personal services) in 
GDP was 52 per cent and that of output excluding the agricultural sector and non-community, 
social and personal services was 72 per cent. 
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Beginning with the specifications using the nominal policy rate, key findings 
are: first, the policy interest rate has a statistically significant negative impact on 
overall growth as well as its major components with a lag of 1 to 2 quarters. An 
increase of 100 bps in the policy interest rate reduces overall GDP growth by 28 
bps with a lag of two quarters and the long-run impact is 39 bps (Table 1, columns 
2 and 12). The long-run impact of a similar increase in the policy rate on non-
agricultural growth is 50 bps (Table 2). Second, non-food credit has a positive and 
significant impact on economic activity, controlling for the impact operating through 
the interest rate variable. This suggests that both the interest and the credit 
channel of monetary policy transmission are important.  
Third, global economic conditions have a positive and statistical significant 
impact on domestic activity. An increase of one percentage point in global GDP 
increases non-agricultural GDP by a similar order in the long-run; the impact is 
found to be quite sizable (225 bps) in the case of industrial production. Fourth, the 
real exchange rate appreciation has the expected dampening impact on economic 
activity, with a lag of 1-2 quarters: 10 per cent real appreciation reduces real GDP 
growth by 40 bps and non-agricultural GDP growth by 120 bps in the long-run.  
Fifth, oil prices are found to have a negative impact on output with a lag of 1 
to 4 quarters. An increase of 10 per cent in international crude oil prices depresses 
GDP growth by around 10 bps. The estimated impact of oil prices on GDP is 
comparable to that of 30 bps from 10 per cent increase in domestic oil inflation in 
RBI (2011a); the relevant variable is international crude oil inflation in our model, 
while it is domestic oil inflation in RBI (2011a). The impact of 50 bps on industry is 
also comparable to that of 100 bps found by Bhattacharya and Bhattacharya 
(2001) for India in a VAR model framework. The impact of 10 bps of oil on GDP in 
our estimates is close to that in Kilian and Vigfusson (2011) for the US; an 
increase of 10 per cent in real oil prices is estimated to lead to a decline of 20-30 
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bps in real GDP in the US and the impact is same for an increase or decrease in 
oil prices.  
Sixth, given that the agricultural sector remains an important component of 
economic activity and still absorbs more than half of labour force, we explore the 
impact of agricultural growth on the various components of GDP. The results 
indicate that agricultural growth impacts services activity contemporaneously but 
industrial activity with a lag. An increase of one per cent in agricultural output 
boosts industrial and services growth by 17-18 bps over the long-run.   
Finally, we examine the role of fiscal policy on growth in two separate ways 
- by analysing the impact of fiscal deficit of the central government and the 
services component ‘community, social and personal services’ on growth. To 
assess the impact of expansionary fiscal policy operating through higher fiscal 
deficit on growth, the baseline specification in column (2) is augmented with the 
fiscal deficit/GDP ratio variable. The fiscal deficit variable (contemporaneous) turns 
out to be positive, but is insignificant. Similar results (not reported) are observed 
even if the fiscal deficit variable is entered with lags (up to the third lag). However, 
higher deficits have a negative and significant impact on activity with a lag of 4 
quarters: an increase of one percentage point in the fiscal deficit/GDP ratio 
reduces real GDP growth by 24 bps after 4 quarters and the long-run impact is 34 
bps (Table 1, columns 4 and 6). The fiscal deficit variable – contemporaneous as 
well as the fourth lag - remains insignificant in non-agricultural growth equation 
(Table 1, columns 14 and 16); the sixth lag (results not reported) is negative and 
significant. Turning to the fiscal policy boost operating through ‘community 
services’, the analysis is restricted to their impact on non-community services and 
non-agricultural GDP (since community services are a part of overall GDP, we do 
not study their impact on overall GDP). Results indicate that ‘community services’ 
positively impact the non-community services as well as non-agricultural GDP; 
however, the impact is temporary as it is reversed fully with a lag (columns 10 and 
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12). Overall, while the growth enhancing impact of expansionary fiscal policy is 
weak, its negative impact through the crowding out channel turns out to be 
significant. Similar results are reported by Raj et al. (2011), who find that the 
positive impact of expansionary fiscal policy on output is highly short-lived, while 
there is a significant negative impact in the medium to long- term. It would be 
useful to analyse the impact of public investment on GDP; however, this analysis 
is handicapped by the absence of such data on a quarterly frequency. 
The diagnostic tests indicate that there is no serial correlation8 and the 
residuals also satisfy the null of normality and homoscedasticity. This is true for 
most of the equations estimated in the paper. The fit of the preferred specifications 
(Table 1, columns 2 and 12) is satisfactory (Chart 4).  
Sensitivity Analysis 
The robustness of the results is examined in two ways: first, through use of 
an alternative nominal interest rate (nominal inter-bank call rate) instead of the 
nominal policy rate (Annex 2) and second, through use of alternative real interest 
rates. Annex 3 and 4 present results with real interest rates derived from y-o-y 
GDP deflator (nominal interest rate less y-o-y GDP deflator inflation) for both the 
policy rate (Annex 3) and the call rate (Annex 4). Annex 5 and 6 take this exercise 
further and focus on real interest rates based on alternative inflation indicators 
(GDP deflator, WPI inflation, and NFMP inflation), and alternative inflation 
averages (four- and eight-quarters); both Annex 5 and 6 restrict to nominal 
effective policy rate. While Annex 5 presents results for real GDP growth, Annex 6 
provides results for non-agricultural growth.  
Turning to the estimations based on the nominal call rate, the long-run 
coefficient of the interest rate drops to 0.35 (from 0.50 with effective policy rate) in 
                                            
8 While the various Tables and Annexes report Box-Pierce-Ljung Q-statistic for 4 lags, sensitivity 
analysis undertaken for longer lags (up to 12 lags) indicates that the null of no residual serial 
correlation holds for longer lags. 
23 
 
the specification for non-agricultural growth (Annex 2). Long-run coefficients of all 
other explanatory variables are broadly unchanged (Table 2 summarises the long-
run coefficients for the various specifications). As regards overall GDP growth, the 
long-run coefficient of interest rate drops only marginally (from 0.39 to 0.32); 
however, coefficients of external demand and REER variables are higher.  
Moving to specifications with real interest rates (Annex 3-6), the coefficients 
of the real interest rate terms are sensitive to the choice of the real interest rate 
and the coefficients are in many cases lower than their corresponding nominal 
interest rate terms. As regards overall GDP growth (Annex 3 to 5), the long-run 
(absolute) coefficients of the real interest rate term are in a range of 0.18-0.42 vis-
a-vis 0.39 of the nominal effective policy interest rate term. The coefficient of the 
real interest term is the highest when 8-quarter moving average inflation rate is 
used to measure expected inflation and compute the real interest rate. Coefficients 
of other explanatory variables are broadly similar across the various real interest 
rate specifications, but higher than their corresponding nominal interest rate 
specifications (Tables 1-2 and Annex 3-5). In the case of non-agricultural growth 
(Annex 3, 4 and 6), the long-run (absolute) coefficients of the real interest rate 
term are estimated in a range of 0.14-0.40 (excluding specifications in columns 4, 
8, 10, 14, 15 and 16 where the variables are either not significant or the residuals 
suffer from serial correlation or heteroscedasticity) vis-a-vis 0.50 on the nominal 
effective interest rate term. Coefficients of other explanatory variables are 
strikingly quite similar across both nominal and real interest rate specifications.  
Inflation Dynamics9 
Headline WPI Inflation 
Beginning with the specification for the headline inflation, the key features 
of the estimates are: first, excess demand conditions have an upward pressure on 
                                            
9 This section draws upon Kapur (2012). 
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inflation. If output gap increases by one percentage point, inflation increases by 20 
bps with a lag of 1 quarter and the long-run impact is 40 bps (Table 3, column 2). 
Second, the inflation process is persistent, with the sum of lagged coefficients 
being around 0.5 and highly significant. Third, global commodity prices have a 
strong and quick pass-through. An increase of 10 per cent in global non-fuel 
commodity prices increases headline WPI inflation by 90 bps in the same quarter, 
with the long-run impact being double (180 basis points). Fourth, the coefficient of 
international crude oil prices (results not reported) is statistically insignificant. This 
could be reflecting delayed and incomplete pass-through of high international 
crude oil prices to domestic prices in view of the administered nature of domestic 
fuel prices. The Government has also modulated the taxes and duties on 
petroleum products to smoothen the impact of volatility in international crude 
prices on domestic inflation.  
Fifth, the exchange rate pass-through coefficient is 0.06 in the short-run and 
0.12 in the long-run, i.e., 10 per cent appreciation (depreciation) of rupee vis-à-vis 
the US dollar reduces (increases) inflation by 60 bps in the same quarter, while the 
long-run pass-through is 120 basis points. The pass-through coefficient is broadly 
the same if nominal effective exchange rate is used in lieu of the rupee-dollar 
exchange rate. Sixth, given the importance of the south-west monsoon, rainfall 
shortage during the month of July – the critical month for kharif sowing - is found to 
have an adverse impact on inflation, with a lag of 2-3 quarters. A deficiency of 10 
per cent in the rainfall in July increases headline inflation by 60 bps with a lag of 3 
quarters and the long-run impact turns out to be 120 basis points. Finally, 
minimum support prices (MSP) have a substantial impact: 10 percentage points 
increase in MSP inflation increases headline WPI inflation by 100 bps with lag of a 
quarter, and the long-run impact is 200 bps. At the same time, MSP inflation also 
respond to headline WPI inflation with a lag of 4 quarters and the long-run impact 
is more than unity (Table 3, column 8).  
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Non-food Manufactured Products Inflation 
Turning to non-food manufactured products (NFMP) inflation (Table 3, 
column 6), the results are qualitatively the same as in the headline inflation case, 
albeit with some differences. First, the impact of demand conditions on inflation is 
now higher than that in the headline inflation case. An increase of one percentage 
point in non-agricultural GDP gap increases NFMP inflation by 28 bps with a lag of 
1 quarter, and the long-run impact is 74 bps - twice the estimates in the headline 
WPI inflation case. Second, NFMP inflation is more persistent compared to 
headline inflation: the sum of lagged inflation coefficients is 0.62 in the case of 
NFMP and 0.50 in the case of headline inflation.  
Third, global commodity inflation remains an important driver of NFMP 
inflation: an increase of 10 per cent in global non-fuel prices increases NFMP 
inflation by 50 bps in the same quarter and 130 bps in the long-run. The impact of 
global commodity inflation on NFMP inflation is thus broadly the same as that on 
headline inflation, which puts certain limits on its uses as a pure core measure of 
inflation (Kapur, 2012). Fourth, international crude oil prices have a statistically 
significant impact on NFMP inflation, but the magnitude is quite modest vis-a-vis 
non-fuel commodity prices. An increase of 10 per cent in international crude oil 
prices increases NFMP inflation by only 10 bps with a lag of 4 quarters; the long-
run impact is 30 bps. Finally, while the rupee-dollar exchange rate coefficient is not 
found to be significant, the NEER is found to be statistically significant. Given the 
measurement convention, the coefficient of the NEER is negative: an increase in 
the NEER indicates appreciation, whereas an increase in the exchange rate of the 
rupee v/s the US dollar indicates depreciation and vice versa. The exchange rate 
pass-through coefficient is 0.03 and 0.08 in the short-run and long-run, 
respectively. Thus, 10 per cent depreciation of the NEER leads to an increase of 
30 bps in the WPI-NFMP inflation in the same quarter and 80 bps in the long-run.  
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The fit of the preferred specifications for both headline and NFMP inflation 
(Table 3, columns 2 and 6) is satisfactory (Chart 5). The residuals satisfy the 
various diagnostics (except for normality in the case of minimum support price 
inflation). 
Short-run sacrifice of output is inevitable if monetary policy wants to reduce 
inflation. The Philips curves estimates suggest sacrifice ratio10 of 2.4 (with 
standard error of 1.13) for the headline inflation and 1.2 (with standard error of 
0.38) for non-food manufactured products inflation, i.e., reduction of headline 
inflation by one percentage point would require a (cumulative) loss of output of 2.4 
per cent and reduction of NFMP inflation by one percentage point would require a 
(cumulative) loss of output of 1.2 per cent. The existing studies for India have 
focussed on headline inflation, and the estimated sacrifice ratio for headline 
inflation of 2.4 in this paper is in consonance with the existing studies (Kapur and 
Patra, 2000). While non-food manufactured products inflation is more persistent 
vis-a-vis headline inflation (which would have had the impact of increasing 
sacrifice ratio), it is also more amenable to variations in demand conditions. The 
latter impact dominates the former and accordingly the sacrifice ratio for NFMP 
inflation is lower than the headline inflation. The lower sacrifice ratio for NFMP 
inflation reflects the greater role of supply shocks emanating from food prices, over 
which monetary policy has relatively weaker impact, in driving headline inflation.  
The estimates of sacrifice ratio are subject to the caveats that these denote 
cumulative output losses (spread over quarters) associated with disinflation 
brought about by monetary policy actions. These are average estimates over the 
sample period and the estimates could differ across specific episodes as well as 
alternative estimation approaches. Moreover, the estimates of 2.4 and 1.2 noted 
earlier are point estimates and these have standard errors of 1.13 and 0.38, 
respectively, which indeed imply a wide range. The sacrifice ratio estimates could 
                                            
10 Sacrifice ratio is (1-sum of coefficients of lagged inflation)/(coefficient of output gap). 
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also depend upon the prevailing inflation rate. The estimates in this paper assume 
a linear relationship between inflation and growth, whereas the relationship could 
be non-linear and subject to threshold effects (Mohanty et al. 2011 and Pattanaik 
and Nadhanael, 2011). 
Bank Credit 
Turning to the behaviour of real non-food bank credit, both income and 
interest rate variables have the expected signs and are statistically significant. In 
response to an increase of one percentage point in real GDP growth, real non-
food credit increases by an almost equivalent amount in the long-run (Table 4, 
column 2). Real non-food credit increases more than proportionally (1.5 per cent in 
the long-run) with respect to non-agricultural growth (Table 4, column 6). As 
regards the impact of the cost of credit, real non-food credit declines by 1.3 per 
cent (non-agricultural GDP specification) and 2.0 per cent (overall GDP 
specification) in the long-run in response to an increase of 100 bps in the nominal 
policy rate. The income as well as the interest rate coefficient estimates are 
broadly comparable if nominal call rate is used in lieu of the nominal policy rate 
(Table 4, columns 4 and 8). Khundrakpam (2011) reports a somewhat higher 
coefficient of 2.2 on the interest rate variable but substantially lower coefficient 
(0.14) on the economic activity variable using a monthly model with industrial 
production as the activity variable and call rate as the policy variable. Foreign 
interest rates have the expected impact on domestic credit, but the coefficient is 
not significant. In principle, higher foreign interest rates make foreign borrowings 
less attractive and increase the demand for domestic credit. In the Indian context, 
access to external commercial borrowings by residents is subject to prudent limits 
(both quantum- and price-based) and this could explain the weak impact of foreign 
interest rates on domestic credit. The estimated equations have a good fit (Chart 
6) and the residuals satisfy the various diagnostics. 
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When the real policy rate and the real call rate are used as the explanatory 
variable in lieu of the corresponding nominal interest rates, the income elasticities 
are somewhat higher, while the interest rate semi-elasticities are lower. The long-
run income elasticities increase from 1.1-1.6 to 1.1-1.8. The interest rate 
coefficient more than halves to 0.72 for the specification with overall GDP growth, 
and loses significance in the specification with non-agricultural GDP (Annex 7).   
Monetary Policy Reaction Function 
Following Clarida et al. (1998, 2000), the central bank is formulated to react 
to expected inflation and growth dynamics. In view of the expected variables 
involved in the regression, the estimation is done through generalized method of 
moments (GMM). The choice of instruments draws upon the variables such as 
growth, inflation, money supply, credit, exchange rate, external demand, and 
foreign interest rate that form part of the Reserve Bank’s multiple indicators 
approach to monetary policy formulation. Estimates indicate that one percentage 
increase each in (2-quarters ahead) expected inflation gap and output gap leads 
the central bank to increase its policy rate by 17-18 bps each. Given the interest 
rate smoothing and the baby step approach to the conduct of monetary policy, the 
long-run coefficients of inflation gap and output gap are substantially higher at 
around 1.5-1.6, i.e., an increase of one percentage point in expected inflation gap 
or output gap ultimately leads to an increase of almost 1.5-1.6 percentage points 
in the policy rate (Table 5 column 2).  
As regards the central bank policy reaction function in terms of NPMF 
inflation and non-agricultural output gap, estimates suggest a stronger response to 
NPMF inflation vis-a-vis the headline inflation case: the long-run coefficient of 
NFMP inflation is almost 2.8 vis-a-vis that of 1.5 in the headline inflation case. On 
the other hand, the long-run response to non-agricultural output gap is almost the 
same as that to overall output gap (Table 5, column 4). The long-run coefficient of 
the inflation term, greater than unity in both the specifications, satisfies the Taylor 
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principle. The estimated equations generally capture the turning points (Chart 7). 
The residuals for the specifications satisfy the various diagnostics, except the 
normality test for the second specification. 
The policy reaction estimates suggest that the neutral policy rate – the 
nominal policy rate when inflation is close to the policy objective and output is 
close to its potential, i.e., both inflation gap and output gap are zero - is around 
5.3-.5.4 per cent (5.3 per cent for the headline specification and 5.4 per cent for 
the non-food manufactured products specification), consistent with Patra and 
Kapur (2012). The neutral rate estimates are subject to the caveat that these are 
point estimates; the standard errors associated with the point estimates of 5.3 and 
5.4 are 0.82 and 1.03, respectively, which suggest a wide band for the neutral 
rate. Thus, as noted by Gokarn (2010), the neutral rate curve is thick and reflective 
of a range of scenarios. 
Model Simulations 
 As indicated earlier, in order to assess the growth-inflation-monetary 
policy dynamics, the various estimated equations are collected into two separate 
models: one focusing on overall real GDP growth and headline inflation (Model A), 
and the other with focus on non-agricultural growth and non-food manufactured 
products inflation to abstract from volatility emanating due to supply shocks (Model 
B). For Model A, the specifications include the following five equations: table 1, 
column 2; table 3, columns 2 and 8; table 4, column 2; and table 5, column 2. For 
Model B, with four equations, the specifications include: table 1, column 12; table 
3, column 6; table 4, column 4; and, table 5, column 4. Responses to shocks to 
both endogenous and exogenous variables are assessed and presented next. 
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First, in response to an increase of one-quarter 100 bps in the nominal 
policy rate11, in terms of the first model (model A), (a) real GDP starts to decline 
with a lag of 2 quarters and the peak response is about 35 bps after 4 quarters (b) 
headline WPI inflation falls with a lag of 3 quarters and the peak fall of around 15 
bps is reached after 6 quarters (c) real GDP and inflation remain below the 
baseline for 3-4 years and (d) the policy rate returns to the baseline after about 2 
years (Chart 8). Second, in terms of model B, in response to an increase of 100 
bps in the nominal policy rate, (a) real non-agricultural GDP starts to decline with a 
lag of 1 quarter and the peak decline is about 40 bps after 2 quarters and (b) 
headline WPI inflation falls with a lag of 2 quarters and the peak fall of around 25 
bps is reached after 5 quarters (Chart 9). However, as noted earlier, the results 
are sensitive to the choice of the interest rate – whether nominal or real. 
Third, in response to one-quarter increase of 100 bps in headline WPI 
inflation, monetary policy is tightened pre-emptively and the policy rate remains 
above the baseline for almost 3 years with a peak increase of 33 bps (Chart 10). 
The response to an equivalent increase of 100 bps in NFMP is stronger and faster: 
the peak increase in the policy rate is 55 bps and the policy rate returns to the 
baseline after 2 years. Fourth, the monetary response to an expected 
strengthening of growth is on similar lines as to that of inflation. 
Fifth, turning to exogenous variables, the impact of exchange rate dynamics 
is assessed. In the model, the nominal exchange rate impacts inflationary 
conditions, while the real effective exchange rate influences demand and output. 
While the nominal and the real effective exchange rate (REER) variables are both 
treated as exogenous in the model, movements in the nominal exchange rate 
                                            
11 The estimates on the impact of interest rates on growth and inflation presented in the previous 
sub-sections were based on single equation specification and can be viewed as the outcome of a 
sustained increase of 100 bps in the interest rate. The results presented in this sub-section, on the 
other hand, are for a one-quarter 100 bps increase in the interest rate and thereafter, the model 
takes over, and the interest rate moves in line with the dynamics of the estimated monetary policy 
reaction function.  
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impact the real exchange rate in real life. Therefore, in order to capture the impact 
of the nominal exchange rate on the REER, results are presented for a shock of 
10 per cent depreciation to both the nominal exchange rate and the REER rate. 
The impulses show that higher demand from real depreciation adds further to 
inflationary pressures from the exchange rate channel. In response to the 
inflationary pressures, monetary policy is tightened and the policy rate returns to 
the baseline after three years (Chart 11). 
Currency depreciation is equivalent to monetary easing as both end up 
increasing demand and prices. According to the estimates in this paper (using the 
results for Model B), 10 per cent currency depreciation is equivalent to a reduction 
of 200 bps in the nominal policy interest rate.  
Dynamic Forecasting Performance 
The forecasting performance of the model equations is satisfactory (Table 
6). Dynamic forecasts over the sample period April-June 2005 to January-March 
2011 show that Theil’s U statistics are substantially less than unity in all cases. 
This is true for the 1-quarter ahead forecast as well as the 4- and 8-quarters ahead 
forecasts. In almost all cases, Theil’s U statistics for the 4- and 8-quarters ahead 
forecasts are lower than the 1-quarter ahead forecast, which can be considered as 
a desirable feature of the model given the monetary transmission lags.  
IV. Conclusion  
This paper examined monetary transmission mechanism for India in the 
context of a small macro model using quarterly data. It modelled dynamics of 
growth, inflation, bank credit and central bank reaction function. Given the volatility 
emanating from the agricultural sector, and its impact on both overall growth and 
inflation, the paper focussed on modelling overall growth and overall inflation as 
well as non-agricultural growth and non-food manufactured products inflation, i.e., 
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components stripped of the influence from the agricultural sector and which are 
more amenable to monetary actions. We also estimate the impact of oil prices, 
real exchange rate and fiscal variables on growth and of exchange rate and 
minimum support prices on inflation. Sensitivity of the results is assessed for 
alternative nominal and real interest rates.  
Regression estimates indicate that an increase of 100 bps in the nominal 
policy interest rate reduces non-agricultural growth by 50 bps in the long-run, while 
an increase of one percentage point in non-agricultural GDP output gap increases 
non-food manufactured products inflation by 74 bps. When the real policy interest 
rate is used in lieu of the nominal interest rate, the impact on growth is sensitive to 
the way the real interest rate is computed. Fiscal deficit has a lagged negative 
impact on GDP growth. The exchange rate pass-through coefficient to inflation is 
around 0.10; although it is low, consistent with that found for low-inflation 
economies, large depreciation can still add to inflationary pressures. Minimum 
support prices impact inflation and are in turn, impacted by past inflation 
movements, which runs the risk of a vicious circle. Oil prices have a muted impact 
on both growth and inflation, which is a reflection of the delayed and incomplete 
pass-through of international crude oil prices to domestic prices. Non-oil 
commodity prices, in comparison, have a stronger and quicker impact on both 
headline and non-food manufactured products inflation, which suggests limitations 
in using non-food manufactured products inflation as a core inflation measure. 
Sacrifice ratio is found to be lower for NFMP inflation compared to headline 
inflation reflecting the stronger impact of demand conditions on NFMP inflation. 
The  standard errors associated with point estimates of sacrifice ratio suggest a 
wide range. The coefficients of the inflation deviation and the output gap in the 
central bank policy reaction are positive and significant and that of the inflation 
terms is greater than unity, consistent with the Taylor principle. The neutral 
nominal policy interest rate is estimated to be around 5.5, but, as in the case of 
sacrifice ratio, the point estimates are subject to wide bands. 
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Model simulations for a one-quarter 100 bps increase in the nominal 
effective policy rate show that the peak effect on non-agricultural growth is 39 bps 
with a lag of 2 quarters and that on non-food manufactured products is 24 bps with 
a lag of 5 quarters. The results in this paper, therefore, show that the interest rate 
channel is effective in the Indian context and the magnitude of the impact on 
growth and inflation is comparable to that in major advanced and emerging 
economies. In the light of the results of this paper, it is clear that RBI’s monetary 
policy had a dampening impact on inflation. At the same time, the results indicate 
that the impact of monetary tightening on inflation is modest. Despite the monetary 
tightening, inflation remained persistently high and this could be attributed to the 
structural component of food inflation (Gokarn, 2012) as well as the surge in 
international commodity prices beginning the second half of 2010 and continuing 
into the first half of 2011. 
Given the sensitivity of the results to the use of nominal and real interest 
rate, future research could focus on the appropriate deflator for assessing real 
interest rate. The VAR-based studies have typically used nominal policy rate to 
assess monetary transmission mechanism. It would be interesting to examine the 
dynamics when real interest rate is used in such studies. While this paper has 
focussed on the impact of monetary policy on overall GDP growth and its sectoral 
components, it would be useful to extend the analysis in this paper to examine the 
impact of monetary actions from the demand side components of GDP, viz., on 
private consumption and investment activity.    
The estimates of the interest rate impact on growth and inflation in this 
paper are subject to the caveats that these are average coefficients. The 
estimates, as the cross-country evidence suggest, could differ across models and 
would depend upon the stage of the business cycle and expectations of economic 
agents. While the model in this paper assumes a linear relationship between the 
various variables, the actual relationships could exhibit asymmetries and the 
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impact of increases and decreases in the policy interest rate on various variables 
could be different. The relationship among the various model variables could be 
non-linear and subject to threshold effects. Furthermore, the Reserve Bank has 
used the policy interest rate in conjunction with modulations in the cash reserve 
ratio and has also deployed countercyclical prudential measures (provisioning 
norms and risk weights) to foster both price and financial stability. The coefficients 
of the interest rate in this paper potentially also include the impact of these non-
interest rate policy measures on economic activity and inflation. 
The impact of monetary policy would also depend upon the liquidity 
conditions: monetary tightening during periods of tight liquidity conditions could be 
more effective and stronger vis-a-vis during conditions of surplus liquidity. The 
operating procedure of monetary policy has been refined over time and this could 
affect monetary transmission dynamics going forward. The introduction of the base 
rate system for loans in 2010 has enhanced transparency in the transmission of 
monetary impulses from the policy rate to lending rates and, going forward, could 
impact estimates of transmission dynamics presented in this paper.  
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Chart 1 : Effect of Monetary Policy Shocks in Alternative Models in Norway 
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Chart 2: Determinants of Growth and Inflation (Model A) 
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Chart 3: Determinants of Non-Agricultural GDP Growth and Inflation (Model B) 
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Chart 4: Real GDP Growth 
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Chart 5: Inflation Movements 
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Chart 6: Bank Credit 
 
 
Note: 
       (a)  using headline inflation and overall GDP growth as the explanatory variables. 
(b)  using non-food manufactured products inflation and  
         non-agricultural GDP growth as the explanatory variables. 
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Chart 7: Nominal Effective Policy Rate 
 
 
Note: 
     (a)  using headline inflation and overall GDP growth as the explanatory variables. 
(b)  using non-food manufactured products inflation and  
       non-agricultural GDP growth as the explanatory variables. 
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Chart 8: Impact of One-Quarter 100 bps Increase in Nominal Policy Interest 
Rate on Growth and Inflation (Model A) 
 
 
Chart 9: Impact of One-Quarter 100 bps Increase in Nominal Policy Interest 
Rate on Growth and Inflation (Model B) 
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Chart 10: Monetary Policy Response to One-Quarter 100 bps Increase in 
Inflation and Growth (Model B) 
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Chart 11: Impact of 10 Per cent Depreciation Each in 
NEER and REER (Model B) 
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 Table 1: Determinants of Growth (Using Nominal Effective Policy Rate) 
Explanatory  
Variable 
Real GDP Growth (Y) IIPG 
 
SERG Non-Agricultural Growth (YNON) 
Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
Constant 5.38 11.6 4.64 6.0 6.13 10.1 -0.60 0.6 4.53 7.9 3.62 7.0 4.22 8.1 3.51 4.6 
                 
 
    -0.16 2.9 -0.32 5.2 -0.32 5.1 -0.31 4.9 
       -0.28 5.4 -0.27 4.6 -0.30 5.5 -0.23 1.8                 
                0.28 4.8 0.29 4.9 0.29 5.6 0.40 4.9 0.26 3.3 0.36 5.8 0.34 3.6 0.35 3.6 
  
 
 0.09 2.3 0.12 2.4 0.11 2.6 1.36 7.4 0.41 8.4 0.64 8.3 0.53 4.8 0.54 5.0 
                  
 
    -0.10 5.8             
        -0.03 1.8 -0.03 1.8 -0.03 1.9 -0.08 1.7     -0.08 5.5 -0.08 4.8 -0.07 4.2 
                 
 
        -0.01 3.3 -0.01 1.7 -0.01 1.4 
                 
 
-0.04 6.3                 
                 
 
    -0.02 4.9             
       -0.01 4.5 -0.01 4.7 -0.01 4.7                     
                 
 
    0.11 5.3             
                 
 
0.11 3.5                 
       0.10 5.9 0.10 6.5 0.08 5.0         0.08 5.4 0.09 4.2 0.10 4.5 
             0.22 1.2  
  
             -0.13 0.9   
                  -0.24 2.3                 0.10 0.7 
               
 
    0.13 9.4             
                 
 
        0.04 3.7 0.03 2.0 0.03 2.1 
                 
 
0.10 3.0               
                  
 
    0.05 2.3 0.06 3.6     
                  
 
    -0.05 3.4           
                  
 
        -0.05 2.2     
DUMAGR -2.10 6.5 -2.17 6.2 -2.15 6.6                   
DUM2001Q1           
 
    -1.77 6.3 -2.68 7.4 -3.11 11.8 -3.18 14.2 
DUM2002Q4 -3.42 11.1 -3.41 11.1 -3.32 10.6                     
DUM2003Q4 3.09 15.1 3.24 15.1 3.06 17.8                 
DUM2005Q3           
 
-4.25 9.2             
DUM2007Q2           
 
5.05 13.0     
  
    
Q1           
 
        0.51 3.1 0.53 3.8 0.54 3.5 
Q2 -0.44 2.0 -0.41 2.1 -0.44 1.9                 
Q3           
 
0.68 1.9             
            
 
                
SEE 0.72   0.72   0.71 
 
1.16   0.70   0.63       
   0.90   0.90   0.90 
 
0.94   0.89   0.92   0.90  0.90  
LB-Q (4) 0.26   
 
  0.33 
 
0.15   0.88   0.06   0.24  0.22  
White χ
2
 0.43   
 
  0.43 
 
0.48   0.49   0.47   0.69  0.56  
JB 0.95   0.95   0.96   0.85   0.60   0.45   0.96  0.99  
Note: 1. Variable names are in Annex 1.  
2. t-statistics are based on HAC standard errors corrected with Newey-West/Bartlett window and three lags.  
3. LB-Q test gives significance level (p-value) of Box-Pierce-Ljung Q-statistic for the null of no residual autocorrelation for 4 lags. 
JB test gives significance level (p-value) for Jarque-Bera test for the null of normality of residuals; White test gives significance 
level (p-value) for White test for the null of homoscedasticity of residuals.  
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Table 2: Long-run Coefficients in Growth Regressions 
Explanatory 
Variable 
Dependent Variable 
Real GDP Growth Real Non-Agricultural GDP Growth 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
    -0.39    -0.49    
      -0.32    -0.35   
            -0.18    -0.14  
              -0.18    -0.13 
   0.13 0.23 0.47 0.48 1.00 1.01 1.09 1.08 
     -0.04 -0.08 -0.12 -0.12 -0.12 -0.14 -0.15 -0.15 
    -0.02 -0.01   -0.01 -0.01   
         -0.01 -0.01   -0.02 -0.02 
    0.14 0.11   0.13 0.11   
       0.09 0.08   0.12 0.11 
        0.07 0.05 0.05 0.05 
         0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 
Note: 
1. Variable names are in Annex 1. 
2. Specifications in columns 2 to 9 of this table are based on Table 1 (column 2), Annex 2 
(column 2), Annex 3 (column 2), Annex 4 (column 2), Table 1 (column 12), Annex 2 (column 
12), Annex 3 (column 12), and Annex 4 (column 12), respectively. 
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Table 3: Determinants of Inflation 
Explanatory Variable 
WPI Inflation (    ) NFMP Inflation (     )      
Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Constant 1.29 3.4 1.38 3.4 1.06 9.2 0.14 0.2 
        0.20 2.2 0.20 2.0 
  
  
                    0.28 3.6   
                 0.89 13.9 0.91 13.2 1.10 18.9 0.85 15.1
                -0.39 4.6 -0.40 4.5 -0.48 8.9   
                0.01 2.1   
     
   
         
  
0.20 2.0 
  
 
 0.09 8.4 0.07 6.3 0.05 7.3   
           -0.05  2.3  -0.03 1.9   
       0.06 3.3 
    
  
         -0.03 2.8 -0.02 2.1
  
  
         -0.03 3.6 -0.02 2.4 
  
  
     
   
 0.10 4.0 0.10 4.7 
  
  
 DUM1998Q3 1.48 4.0 1.70 4.8 
  
  
 DUM1999Q1         2.20 11.9   
 DUM2000Q4 1.88 10.7 2.15 13.5 
  
  
 DUM2003Q4 2.17 14.3 1.70 7.8 
  
  
 DUM2005Q3         -1.98 13.2   
           
  
  
 Sum of coefficients of the  
   lagged dependent variable 0.50  10.1 0.51  10.1 0.62 16.1 2.11 
    0.88   0.88   0.92 
 
0.73 
 LB-Q (4) 0.51   0.51   0.69 
 
0.75 
 White Test 0.42   0.42   0.14 
 
0.87 
 JB Test 0.90   0.90   0.94  0.00  
Note: See notes to Table 1. 
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Table 4: Estimates of Real Non-food Credit Growth 
 Growth in Real Non-food Credit (rnfc) 
Explanatory 
Variable Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Constant 3.71 3.3 3.22 3.5 2.05 2.4 1.68 2.1 
     0.24 3.2 0.21 3.0     
              0.46 5.6 0.43 6.0 
       -0.44 2.8   -0.38 2.6   
          -0.34 2.8   -0.29 2.9 
      
 
 0.21 1.5 0.11 0.9 0.23 1.5 0.14 1.1 
                0.97 16.2 1.01 17.9 0.95 14.4 0.99 19.5 
                -0.19 3.7 -0.22 4.2 -0.24 5.2 -0.26 5.7 
DUM2005Q3 4.57 9.0 4.53 10.1 4.15 9.6 4.16 10.2 
DUM2006Q1 4.04 6.7 4.12 8.0 4.51 8.7 4.54 10.3 
DUM2008Q4 5.18 10.6 5.14 9.6 5.32 12.8 5.25 11.6 
DUM2009Q4 -9.20 24.6 -9.03 31.5 -8.28 22.9 -8.19 28.8 
            
        
 
   
 0.78 27.1 0.80 22.7 0.70 19.8 0.73 24.9 
    0.95  0.95  0.96  0.96  
LB-Q (4) 0.38  0.67  0.36  0.50  
White Test 0.62  0.59  0.33  0.13  
JB test 0.93   0.64   0.59  0.65  
Note: See notes to Table 1. 
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Table 5: Monetary Policy Reaction Function 
Explanatory Variable 
Effective Policy Interest Rate (int) 
Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
1 2 3 4 5 
Constant 0.59 2.2 0.42 1.9 
       
     0.17 3.6   
        0.18 2.1   
       
       0.22 5.0 
             0.14 2.2 
       0.89 23.7 0.92 30.1 
     
    0.84   0.86  
LB-Q (4) 0.92   0.88  
J-specification 7.40   6.69  
Significance of J-statistic (p-value) 0.60   0.75  
White Test 0.00   0.00  
 (0.57)  (0.11)  
JB Test 0.08   0.00  
Note:  
1. Variable names are in Annex 1.  
2. t-statistics are based on HAC standard errors corrected with Newey-West/Bartlett 
window and three lags.  
3. LB-Q test gives significance level (p-value) of Box-Pierce-Ljung Q-statistic for the null of 
no residual autocorrelation for 4 lags. JB test gives significance level (p-value) for Jarque-
Bera test for the null of normality of residuals; White test gives significance level (p-value) 
for White test for the null of homoscedasticity of residuals. Figure in parenthesis for the 
White test is significance level (p-value) for White test based on fitted values and their 
squares.  
4. Estimation is by GMM methodology for the sample period 1997:2 to 2011:1 using one 
lags each of the following variables as instruments: int, ygap,         ,        ,        , 
  , oil, exch, nfc, m3 and fedtarget for the specification in column 2 and int, ynongap, 
        ,        ,        ,         ,   , oil, exch, nfc, m3 and fedtarget for the 
specification in column 4. J-specification and its significance is test for over-identifying 
restrictions. 
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Table 6: Forecasting Performance  
Item  One-step  
ahead forecast 
4-step  
ahead forecast 
8-step  
ahead forecast 
1  2 3 4 
GDP Growth (Table 1, column 2)  
Mean Error  0.04 0.24 0.42 
Mean Absolute Error  0.37 0.45 0.53 
Root Mean Square Error  0.44 0.60 0.86 
Theil’s U  0.46 0.35 0.43 
Non-Agricultural Growth (Table 1, column 12)  
Mean Error  0.03 0.29 0.59 
Mean Absolute Error  0.43 0.56 0.75 
Root Mean Square Error  0.50 0.72 0.92 
Theil’s U  0.42 0.25 0.28 
WPI Inflation (Table 3, column 2)  
Mean Error  -0.03 -0.12 0.42 
Mean Absolute Error  0.49 1.13 1.22 
Root Mean Square Error  0.59 1.42 1.58 
Theil’s U  0.28 0.28 0.56 
WPI Non-food Manufactured Products Inflation (Table 3, column 6)  
Mean Error  -0.13 -0.66 -0.12 
Mean Absolute Error  0.58 1.19 1.17 
Root Mean Square Error  0.71 1.32 1.39 
Theil’s U  0.42 0.29 0.39 
Bank Credit (Table 4, column 2)  
Mean Error  -0.06 0.21 0.91 
Mean Absolute Error  0.76 1.46 2.69 
Root Mean Square Error  1.07 1.76 3.32 
Theil’s U  0.39 0.29 0.40 
Bank Credit (Table 4, column 4)  
Mean Error  -0.04 0.13 1.55 
Mean Absolute Error  0.77 1.05 1.68 
Root Mean Square Error  0.99 1.34 2.10 
Theil’s U  0.36 0.22 0.25 
Monetary Policy Reaction Function (Table 4, column 2)  
Mean Error  -0.17 -0.79 -0.90 
Mean Absolute Error  0.63 1.34 1.69 
Root Mean Square Error  0.82 1.83 2.24 
Theil’s U  0.85 0.79 0.70 
Monetary Policy Reaction Function (Table 4, column 4)  
Mean Error  -0.04 -0.59 -0.94 
Mean Absolute Error  0.51 0.97 1.19 
Root Mean Square Error  0.68 1.22 1.40 
Theil’s U  0.71 0.53 0.43 
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Annex 1 
List of Variables 
 
agrg : growth (y-o-y) in real agricultural GDP 
call : nominal call money rate 
              : real call rate based on y-o-y GDP deflator inflation = call -       
comg : growth  (y-o-y) in ‘community, social and personal services’ real GDP 
dumagr : dummy for quarters with negative growth in real agricultural GDP (= 1 if 
growth is negative, 0 otherwise) 
exch : variation (y-o-y) in the exchange rate of the rupee against the US dollar 
fedtarget : US federal funds target rate 
fp : fiscal policy variable [either fiscal deficit/GDP ratio (gfdgdp) or growth in 
‘community, social and personal services’(comg)]. 
gfdgdp : gross fiscal deficit/GDP ratio (seasonally adjusted) 
iipg : growth (y-o-y) in index of industrial production 
int : nominal effective policy interest rate 
     : nominal foreign interest rate (LIBOR 1 year) 
int4Q : four-quarter moving average of int 
int8Q : eight-quarter moving average of int 
m3 : variation (y-o-y) in broad money supply (M3) 
neer : variation (y-o-y) in the RBI’s 36-currency trade-weighted nominal 
effective exchange rate 
nfc : variation (y-o-y) in non-food credit 
oil : global crude oil inflation (y-o-y) 
oilwpi : global crude oil inflation (y-o-y) less WPI inflation (-y-o-y) 
q1,q2, q3 : dummies for quarters April-June, July-September and October-
December, respectively 
rain : deviation of rainfall from normal in the month of July = actual rainfall 
during July less normal rainfall during July 
reer : variation (y-o-y) in the RBI’s 36-currency trade-weighted real effective 
exchange rate 
rnfc : variation (y-o-y) in real non-food credit 
serg : growth (y-o-y) in real services GDP excluding ‘community, social and 
personal services 
y : real GDP growth (y-o-y) 
yf : global GDP growth (y-o-y) (based on IMF’s WEO database) 
ygap : output gap (actual real GDP less trend (Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filtered) 
real GDP, using seasonally adjusted data) 
ynon : growth (y-o-y) in real GDP excluding agriculture and ‘community, social 
and personal services’ 
ynongap : non-agricultural output gap (actual real GDP excluding agriculture and  
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non-community, personal and social services less its trend (Hodrick-
Prescott (HP) filtered), using seasonally adjusted data). 
 
   : global non-fuel commodity inflation (y-o-y) (based on IMF’s index of 
commodity prices). 
      : GDP deflator inflation (y-o-y) 
        : four-quarter moving average of         
        : eight-quarter moving average of       
     : minimum support price inflation (y-o-y) = simple average of MSP inflation 
movements in the four major commodities, viz., wheat, rice, tur and gram. 
      : non-food manufactured products WPI inflation (y-o-y) 
        : four-quarter moving average of       
        : eight-quarter moving average of       
     : wholesale price index (WPI) inflation (y-o-y) 
       : four-quarter moving average of      
       : eight-quarter moving average of      
        : deviation of CPI inflation (y-o-y) from 5 per cent 
         : deviation of GDP deflator inflation (y-o-y) from 5 per cent 
        : deviation of WPI inflation (y-o-y) from 5 per cent 
         : deviation of non-food manufactured products WPI inflation (y-o-y) from its 
medium term average of 4 per cent 
Note: All data (interest rates, variations and growth rates) are expressed in percentage terms. 
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Annex 2: Determinants of Growth (using nominal call rate) 
Explanatory 
Variable 
Real GDP Growth (Y) IIPG SERG Non-agricultural Growth (YNON) 
Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
Constant 5.32 8.6 4.66 5.0 5.65 8.6 -0.21 -0.2 4.51 7.17 3.36 6.9 3.76 6.1 3.25 4.3 
            
  
    
  
-0.13 -2.12 -0.23 -4.0 -0.27 -5.1 -0.25 -4.5 
        -0.24 -3.6 -0.22 -3.1 -0.24 -3.6 -0.28 -3.1     
  
    
 
  
                0.26 4.1 0.28 4.2 0.27 4.5 0.36 4.7 0.24 2.94 0.34 5.8 0.30 3.7 0.31 4.0 
  
 
 0.17 3.7 0.19 3.7 0.18 3.6 1.39 8.6 0.44 7.50 0.67 10.1 0.60 7.4 0.55 6.0 
            
  
    
  
-0.11 -4.74 
  
    
 
  
        -0.06 -3.1 -0.06 -3.3 -0.06 -3.1 -0.08 -2.1     -0.10 -6.5 -0.09 -7.1 -0.09 -6.8 
           
  
    
  
0.10 5.05 
  
    
 
  
           
  
    0.11 3.3     
  
    
 
  
       0.08 5.0 0.08 5.6 0.07 4.5 
  
    0.08 4.3 0.09 4.2 0.10 4.5 
            0.18 1.0     
  
    
  
0.05 0.3 
 
  
              
  
-0.13 -1.1 
  
    
  
    0.21 1.2 
           
  
    
  
    -0.01 -3.4 -0.01 -1.6 -0.004 -1.1 
           
  
    -0.04 -6.2     
  
    
 
  
           
  
    
  
-0.02 -4.51 
  
    
 
  
       -0.01 -2.5 -0.01 -2.6 -0.01 -2.5 
  
    
  
    
 
  
         
  
    
  
0.13 9.30 
  
    
 
  
           
  
    
  
    0.04 3.5 0.03 2.4 0.03 2.2 
           
  
    0.11 3.4     
  
    
 
  
            
  
    
  
0.05 2.34 0.06 3.7     
 
  
            
  
    
  
-0.05 -3.30 
  
    
 
  
            
  
    
  
    -0.04 -2.0     
 
  
DUMAGR -2.16 -7.1 -2.22 -6.7 -2.19 -7.2 
  
    
  
    
 
  
DUM2001Q1     
  
    
  
-1.81 -6.66 -2.74 -8.6 -3.15 -13.0 -3.12 -15.5 
DUM2002Q4 -3.32 -10.3 -3.33 -9.9 -3.27 -10.2 
  
    
  
    
 
  
DUM2003Q4 2.85 12.4 2.99 12.4 2.83 12.9 
  
    
  
    
 
  
DUM2005Q3     
  
    -4.44 -9.4     
  
    
 
  
DUM2007Q2     
  
    5.31 18.4     
  
    
 
  
Q1     
  
    
  
    0.51 3.4 0.55 3.4 0.58 3.6 
Q2 -0.42 -1.9 -0.39 -2.0 -0.42 -1.9 
  
    
  
    
 
  
Q3     
  
    0.82 2.4     
  
    
 
  
      
  
    
  
    
  
    
 
  
SEE 0.72   0.72 
 
0.73   1.09 
 
0.71   0.65 
 
0.71   0.71   
   0.89   0.89 
 
0.89   0.95 
 
0.89   0.92 
 
0.90   0.90   
LB-Q (4) 0.33   0.29 
 
0.41   0.17 
 
0.98   0.30 
 
0.21   0.42   
White Test 0.43   0.36 
 
0.74   0.43 
 
0.59   0.48 
 
0.43   0.60   
JB Test 0.87   0.60   0.82   0.82   0.85   0.81   0.92   0.80   
Note: See notes to Table 1. 
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Annex 3: Determinants of Growth (Using real effective policy interest rate) 
Explanatory 
Variable  
Real GDP Growth (Y)  IIPG 
 
SERG Non-agricultural Growth (YNON) 
Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
Constant 3.88 9.9 3.63 6.7 4.25 8.3 -1.62 -4.4 4.26 6.2 2.51 3.7 3.00 4.8 1.98 2.7 
               
    
  
  
-0.09 -3.4 -0.10 -1.7 -0.06 1.6 -0.06 1.6 
               -0.12 3.3 -0.12 -3.2 -0.12 -3.5 
      
    
               
    
  -0.10 -2.7 
    
    
                0.29 3.9 0.30 4.2 0.30 4.2 0.38 5.4 0.25 2.8 0.31 2.9 0.35 2.4 0.38 2.7 
  
 
 0.33 4.2 0.34 4.0 0.37 3.8 1.43 10.4 0.46 7.7 0.75 7.9 0.57 4.9 0.54 4.6 
        
    
  
  
-0.12 -5.2 
  
    
        -0.08 3.0 -0.08 -3.0 -0.09 -3.0 -0.10 -2.3 
  
-0.10 -6.9 -0.10 -6.2 -0.09 4.8 
        
    
  
  
0.10 4.6 
  
    
        
    
  0.11 3.2 
    
    
        0.06 2.7 0.06 2.7 0.05 2.1 
    
0.08 3.7 0.08 3.0 0.10 3.6 
          -0.01 2.3 -0.01 -2.2 -0.01 -2.4 
    
-0.02 -5.7 -0.01 3.4 -0.01 3.2 
          
    
  -0.04 -7.9 
    
    
          
    
  
  
-0.02 -4.7 
  
    
     
    
  
  
0.14 8.9 
  
    
       
    
  
    
0.04 2.5 0.02 1.0 0.02 1.3 
       
    
  
0.10 2.4 
    
    
        
  
0.08 0.5   
      
-0.16 1.0   
          
    
-0.18 1.6 
      
  0.22 1.3 
        
    
  
  
0.04 1.8 0.06 3.7     
        
    
  
  
-0.06 -3.6 
  
    
        
    
  
    
-0.06 -1.9     
DUMAGR -2.12 5.8 -2.16 5.6 -2.15 5.9 
      
    
DUM2001Q1 
    
  
  
-1.51 -4.3 -2.73 -5.7 -3.27 10.9 -3.33 13.3 
DUM2002Q4 -3.22 7.9 -3.20 7.7 -3.15 7.8 
      
    
DUM2003Q4 2.67 12.2 2.71 11.6 2.62 11.5 
      
    
DUM2005Q3 
    
  -4.34 -9.7 
    
    
DUM2007Q2 
    
  4.89 17.4 
    
  
  
Q1 
    
  
    
0.47 2.7 0.51 3.5 
0.54 3.5 
Q2 -0.37 1.9 -0.36 2.0 -0.37 1.9 
      
  
  
Q3 
    
  0.76 2.2 
    
    
     
  
      
    
SEE 0.78 
 
1.16 
 
1.16  1.16 
 
0.72 
 
0.72 
 
0.72  0.72  
   0.87 
 
0.87 
 
0.87 
 
0.94 
 
0.88 
 
0.90 
 
0.87  0.87 
 
LB-Q (4) 0.67 
 
0.62 
 
0.56 
 
0.15 
 
0.95 
 
0.19 
 
0.48  0.49 
 
White Test 0.43 
 
0.30 
 
0.43 
 
0.49 
 
0.43 
 
0.43 
 
0.43  0.43 
 
JB Test 0.44 
 
0.45 
 
0.39 
 
0.40 
 
0.87 
 
0.46 
 
0.98  0.71 
 
Note: See notes to Table 1. 
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Annex 4: Determinants of Growth (using real call rate) 
Explanatory 
Variable 
Real GDP Growth (Y) IIPG SERG   Non-agricultural Growth (YNON) 
Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
Constant 4.08 11.7 3.87 7.7 4.38 9.7 -1.59 -4.4 4.32 6.2 2.58 4.5 2.47 3.0 2.14 3.3 
                    
  
    
  
-0.08 -3.3 -0.09 -2.0 -0.07 -2.0 -0.07 -1.9 
                -0.14 -3.8 -0.13 -3.8 -0.13 -4.0 
  
    
  
    
 
  
                    
  
    -0.09 -3.0     
  
    
 
  
                0.26 4.0 0.27 4.2 0.27 4.3 0.37 5.2 0.24 2.7 0.31 3.2 0.34 2.5 0.34 2.7 
  
 
 0.36 5.0 0.37 4.7 0.39 4.3 1.45 10.8 0.47 7.4 0.74 7.7 0.61 5.5 0.55 4.9 
            
  
    
  
-0.12 -4.6 
  
    
 
  
        -0.09 -3.8 -0.09 -3.8 -0.09 -3.6 -0.10 -2.4     -0.11 -6.7 -0.10 -5.3 -0.09 -5.1 
            
  
    
  
0.10 4.3 
  
    
 
  
            
  
    0.11 3.2     
  
    
 
  
        0.06 2.9 0.06 2.9 0.05 2.3 
  
    0.08 3.6 0.09 3.4 0.10 3.7 
         
  
    
  
0.13 9.2 
  
    
 
  
           
  
    
  
    0.03 2.5 0.02 1.4 0.02 1.4 
           
  
    0.10 2.4     
  
    
 
  
          -0.01 -2.8 -0.01 -2.7 -0.01 -2.8 
  
    -0.02 -5.1 -0.01 -3.3 -0.01 -3.1 
              
  
    -0.04 -8.0     
  
    
 
  
              
  
    
  
-0.02 -4.5 
  
    
 
  
            0.07 0.4     
  
    
  
    
 
  
              
  
    
  
    
  
0.07 0.5 
 
  
              
  
-0.15 -1.2 
  
    
  
    0.23 1.3 
            
  
    
  
0.04 1.8 0.06 3.7     
 
  
            
  
    
  
-0.06 -3.5 
  
    
 
  
            
  
    
  
    -0.06 -2.0     
 
  
DUMAGR -2.10 -6.4 -2.13 -6.1 -2.12 -6.6 
  
    
  
    
 
  
DUM2001Q1     
  
    
  
-1.55 -4.5 -2.74 -6.1 -3.34 -13.0 -3.29 -13.2 
DUM2002Q4 -3.24 -9.0 -3.22 -8.7 -3.18 -9.1 
  
    
  
    
 
  
DUM2003Q4 2.66 13.3 2.69 12.8 2.62 12.7 
  
    
  
    
 
  
DUM2005Q3     
  
    -4.29 -9.8     
  
    
 
  
DUM2007Q2     
  
    4.81 18.3     
  
    
 
  
Q1     
  
    
  
    0.48 2.9 0.52 3.5 0.54 3.6 
Q2 -0.35 -1.8 -0.33 -1.9 -0.34 -1.8 
  
    
  
    
 
  
Q3     
  
    0.77 2.2     
  
    
 
  
      
  
    
  
    
  
    
 
  
SEE 0.74   0.75 
 
0.75   1.16 
 
0.72   0.71 
 
0.81   0.80   
   0.89   0.88 
 
0.88   0.94 
 
0.88   0.90 
 
0.87   0.87   
LB-Q (4) 0.71   0.69 
 
0.62   0.16 
 
0.97   0.25 
 
0.38   0.49   
White Test 0.43   0.47 
 
0.48   0.47 
 
0.52   0.61 
 
0.47   0.51   
JB Test 0.75   0.75   0.71   0.31   0.93   0.64   0.90   0.53   
Note: See notes to Table 1. 
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Annex 5: Determinants of Real GDP Growth  
(Using alternative measures of real effective policy interest rate)  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Constant 3.88 4.00 4.27 4.13 3.97 3.86 4.40 4.56 3.89 4.24 
(9.9)  (9.5) (8.8) (10.3) (8.8) (8.4) (10.4) (10.5) (8.6) (11.0) 
               
-0.12          
(3.3)          
                   
 -0.14         
 (3.8)         
                   
 -0.18        
  (3.5)        
                 
   -0.19       
   (4.2)       
                 
    -0.15      
    (3.9)      
              
     -0.12     
     (2.3)     
                  
     -0.23    
      (3.5)    
                  
      -0.30   
       (5.4)   
                
        -0.20  
        (3.7)  
                
         -0.29 
         (5.9) 
     0.29 0.28 0.28 0.25 0.30 0.34 0.29 0.27 0.30 0.27 
(3.9) (3.4) (3.3) (3.1) (3.3) (3.7) (3.6) (3.8) (3.3) (3.8) 
  
 
 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.30 0.30 0.28 0.30 0.31 0.25 
(4.2) (4.2) (4.1) (4.4) (3.9) (3.8) (3.4) (3.9) (3.8) (3.3) 
        -0.08 -0.08 -0.09 -0.07 -0.07 -0.10 -0.09 -0.09 -0.08 -0.05 
(3.0) (3.0) (3.1) (2.6) (2.3) (3.3) (3.1) (3.0) (2.6) (2.1) 
        0.06 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.07 
(2.7) (2.7) (2.4) (3.2) (2.6) (1.9) (2.4) (2.4) (2.6) (3.8) 
          -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 
(2.3) (2.1) (2.4) (1.8) (2.2) (0.7) (0.7) (1.6) (0.7) (1.6) 
DUMAGR_NEG -2.12 -2.12 -2.15 -2.08 -2.23 -2.19 -2.20 -2.19 -2.15 -2.29 
(5.8) (5.5) (5.5) (5.3) (5.1) (5.5) (5.9) (6.0) (5.1) (5.9) 
DUM2002Q4 -3.22 -3.18 -3.17 -3.10 -3.08 -3.09 -3.05 -3.19 -2.93 -3.14 
(7.9) (8.0) (7.6) (7.5) (6.8) (7.3) (8.2) (8.6) (6.2) (8.6) 
DUM2003Q4 2.67 2.75 2.84 2.82 2.76 2.73 2.99 3.01 2.69 3.01 
(12.2) (11.2) (10.6) (11.5) (10.1) (7.7) (9.1) (12.8) (9.8) (14.1) 
Q2 -0.37 -0.38 -0.38 -0.34 -0.38 -0.43 -0.40 -0.40 -0.38 -0.40 
(1.9) (2.1) (2.0) (1.9) (2.1) (2.4) (2.2) (2.1) (2.0) (2.0) 
 
          
  0.87 0.87 0.87 0.88 0.87 0.86 0.87 0.88 0.87 0.89 
LB-Q(4) 0.67 0.77 0.73 0.79 0.52 0.78 0.79 0.83 0.68 0.79 
White Test 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 
JB Test 0.44 0.24 0.38 0.27 0.17 0.58 0.35 0.29 0.18 0.12 
Long-run coefficients 
               -0.18 
                             -0.20 
                            
 
-0.25 
                        
   
-0.25 
                       
    
-0.22 
                   
     
-0.19 
                      
      
-0.33 
                     
       
-0.42 
                  
        
-0.29 
                 
         
-0.40 
  
 
 0.47 0.46 0.46 0.43 0.43 0.46 0.40 0.41 0.45 0.35 
        -0.12 -0.11 -0.12 -0.09 -0.10 -0.15 -0.12 -0.13 -0.11 -0.07 
        0.09 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.10 
          -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 
Note: See notes to Table 1. Figures in parenthesis are t-statistics. 
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Annex 6: Determinants of Real Non-Agricultural GDP Growth (contd...) 
(Using alternative measures of real effective policy interest rate)  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
Constant 2.51 3.02 2.61 2.75 2.54 3.08 3.98 2.07 2.86 2.18 3.18 3.34 4.44 3.14 3.03 
(3.7) (3.7) (2.9) (4.1) (4.1) (5.5) (5.3) (4.2) (6.4) (4.6) (7.3) (6.5) (6.9) (6.8) (6.1) 
               
-0.10 
              (1.7) 
              
                  
-0.15 
             
 
(2.0) 
             
                     
-0.12 
            
  
(1.3) 
            
                    
-0.14 
           
   
(1.9) 
           
                     
-0.15 
          
    
(2.0) 
          
                       
-0.28 
         
     
(3.9) 
         
                        
-0.40 
        
      
(3.9) 
        
                       
-0.16 
       
       
(2.1) 
       
                        
-0.34 
      
        
(5.0) 
      
                        
-0.12 
     
         
(2.5) 
     
                         
-0.25 
    
          
(6.9) 
    
                              
-0.28 
   
           
(6.3) 
   
                               
-0.42 
  
            
(6.9) 
  
                              
-0.25 
 
             
(6.7) 
 
                               
-0.32 
              
(7.3) 
        
0.31 0.26 0.35 0.29 0.36 0.32 0.17 0.37 0.29 0.40 0.34 0.31 0.18 0.35 0.32 
(2.9) (2.0) (3.2) (2.6) (3.8) (5.0) (1.8) (3.9) (4.2) (5.1) (5.4) (4.4) (2.0) (5.3) (4.4) 
  
 
 
0.75 0.77 0.71 0.76 0.69 0.66 0.79 0.73 0.71 0.70 0.69 0.74 0.86 0.66 0.75 
(7.9) (7.9) (7.4) (8.0) (8.9) (9.5) (10.6) (8.0) (13.0) (7.8) (11.5) (11.4) (12.3) (9.1) (14.4) 
        
-0.10 -0.11 -0.12 -0.11 -0.09 -0.12 -0.14 -0.11 -0.07 -0.12 -0.10 -0.11 -0.13 -0.09 -0.07 
(6.9) (7.6) (6.1) (7.6) (6.8) (9.1) (9.3) (7.0) (7.1) (6.6) (5.5) (7.8) (10.5) (5.6) (4.7) 
          
-0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
(5.7) (5.3) (5.0) (4.6) (5.4) (2.7) (5.2) (3.4) (5.1) (3.8) (5.4) (4.6) (6.0) (4.9) (6.5) 
        
0.08 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.10 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.08 
(3.7) (3.7) (3.5) (3.8) (3.8) (5.0) (4.8) (3.5) (6.3) (3.5) (3.5) (3.4) (3.4) (4.3) (4.5) 
       
0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 
(2.5) (2.7) (2.3) (2.7) (2.4) (1.2) (3.1) (3.3) (2.7) (2.5) (0.1) (0.7) (1.8) (0.6) (2.0) 
        
0.06 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.06 
(3.7) (2.4) (2.5) (2.4) (2.1) (3.0) (3.8) (4.5) (2.7) (4.4) (3.7) (3.6) (4.5) (2.5) (3.2) 
        
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.0) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) 
(1.9) (2.3) (1.7) (2.1) (2.0) (2.3) (3.2) (1.9) (2.8) (1.4) (1.0) (1.4) (2.3) (1.8) (2.1) 
DUM2001Q1 
-2.73 -2.58 -2.71 -2.57 -2.58 -2.49 -2.52 -2.87 -2.48 -2.93 -3.09 -2.82 -2.81 -2.97 -2.75 
(5.7) (5.5) (5.3) (5.2) (5.1) (7.0) (7.1) (6.9) (6.1) (7.3) (10.7) (8.4) (9.3) (9.6) (7.9) 
Q1 
0.47 0.45 0.44 0.45 0.49 0.34 0.41 0.47 0.53 0.38 0.46 0.39 0.41 0.40 0.53 
(2.7) (2.6) (2.4) (2.4) (2.7) (1.7) (2.1) (2.4) (3.4) (2.1) (2.9) (2.2) (2.5) (2.4) (3.9) 
                  0.90 0.9 0.89 0.9 0.9 0.92 0.92 0.90 0.93 0.90 0.93 0.92 0.93 0.92 0.93 
LB-Q(4) 0.19 0.17 0.17 0.11 0.15 0.08 0.02 0.07 0.045 0.26 0.11 0.08 0.02 0.09 0.02 
White Test 0.46 0.43 0.47 0.52 0.51 0.47 0.43 0.49 0.48 0.47 0.56 0.43 0.51 0.04 0.43 
JB Test 0.46 0.42 0.49 0.53 0.43 0.72 0.57 0.46 0.33 0.78 0.62 0.78 0.46 0.56 0.26 
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Annex 6: Determinants of Real Non-Agricultural GDP Growth (concld.) 
(Using alternative measures of real effective policy interest rate)  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
Long-run coefficients 
                              -0.14 
                               
 
-0.20 
                                
  
-0.19 
                            
   
-0.20 
                            
    
-0.23 
                            
     
-0.41 
                          
      
-0.48 
                       
       
-0.25 
                       
        
-0.47 
                     
         
-0.20 
                    
          
-0.37 
                       
           
-0.40 
                     
            
-0.51 
 
 
                 
             
-0.38 
                  
              
-0.46 
  
 
 1.09 1.03 1.10 1.07 1.08 0.98 0.96 1.16 0.99 1.17 1.05 1.07 1.05 1.01 1.09 
        -0.15 -0.15 -0.18 -0.16 -0.15 -0.17 -0.17 -0.18 -0.10 -0.19 -0.15 -0.16 -0.16 -0.13 -0.10 
          -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
        0.12 0.12 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.11 0.12 
       0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03 
        0.09 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.11 0.07 0.12 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 
        -0.09 -0.10 -0.09 -0.09 -0.10 -0.07 -0.08 -0.08 -0.10 -0.06 -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 -0.07 
Note: See notes to Table 1. Figures in parenthesis are t-statistics. 
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Annex 7: Estimates of Real Non-food Credit Growth (using real interest rates) 
Explanatory Variable 
Growth in Real Non-food Credit (rnfc) 
Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Constant 1.21 2.7
 
1.41 2.9
 
-0.10 0.1 0.07 0.1 
     0.22 3.2 0.19 2.2         
                0.46 4.7 0.44 4.7 
               -0.13 -2.3    -0.07  1.4   
                  -0.13 2.0    -0.07  1.2 
        1.02 15.4 1.05 14.5 0.99 18.0 1.00 16.0 
        -0.20 -3.6 -0.22 -3.7 -0.25 -4.9 -0.26 -4.8 
DUM2005Q3 4.86 10.3 4.91 11.0 4.41 9.6 4.47 10.3 
DUM2006Q1 4.40 8.2 4.34 8.1 4.82 10.3 4.78 9.9 
DUM2008Q4 3.80 23.7 3.85 19.8 4.15 23.5 4.15 24.2 
DUM2009Q4 -8.44 -43.8 -8.34 -39.2 -7.71 -40.9 -7.71 -45.5 
             
        
 
   
 
0.82  26.0 0.82 23.4 0.74  23.0 0.74  21.7 
   0.95   0.95  0.95   0.95   
LB-Q (4) 0.36   0.46  0.69   0.39   
White Test 0.32   0.46  0.32   0.35   
JB test 0.80  0.70  0.48  0.45  
Note: See notes to Table 1. 
 
 
 
